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This is an exciting time at which to be involved in intellectual
property. When I began teaching, this field was something of a
backwater. Around thirty people took my introductory course; only
seven went on to study patent law. Indeed, patent law was so
esoteric, practitioners were historically among the very few lawyers
ethically permitted to advertise their specialty.!
In the last decade, however, all of that has changed. Not only are
there many more students, what is really interesting as is the level of
attention that this field is now receiving from Congress and the courts.
Many new rights are being recognized, and old ones are expanding.
Trademark holders now enjoy protection that goes well beyond the
classic case of passing off. Actionable harms have come to include
tarnishment, blurring, and cybersquatting, as well as both post-sale
t Professor of Law, NYU School of Law and Director, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and
Policy. This article is based on a speech delivered at Santa Clara University School of Law. I
would like to thank the Law School for inviting me and members of the audience for the many
interesting ideas they gave me. This work was supported by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max
E. Greenberg Research Fund of the N.Y.U. School of Law.
1. See, e.g., MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4; John A. Payton, Note,
Certification of Specialization: Another Limit on Attorney Advertising Is Peeled Away, 25 IND.
L. REv. 589, 611 (1991).
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and initial-interest confusion. According to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
3
fact works are supposed to remain in the public domain. But no
matter. Increasingly, they are protectable-through encryption (itself
protected by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act4), by contract,5 by
the tort of misappropriation,6 and soon, perhaps, through the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Ace and a federal database
statute.' But the development that has probably caused the most
concern is State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc.,' the Federal Circuit decision recognizing business
method patents. Think how the airline industry might now be
structured if the first company to offer frequent flyer miles had
enjoyed the sole right to award them or how differently mergers and
acquisitions would be financed (and how rich Michael Milken might
have become) if the use of junk bonds had been protected by a patent.
The trend toward expanding protection deserves attention, with the
advent of business method patenting deserving the most attention of
all.
In many ways, this expansion in rights is not surprising.
Information products are now a large part of the economy and for the
first time, leading economic indicators reflect their contribution to
prosperity. That is, for many years, productivity figures were
stagnant, and this was true despite the invention and widespread
adoption of the computer, which everyone was sure had to be
increasing productivity. There was much headscratching about why
the numbers weren't rising-whether social dislocations caused by
technology outweigh benefits; whether economists were unable
properly to evaluate the service economy or to grapple with units of
production that, over time, become more complex rather than
cheaper.'0 Recently, however, the productivity figures have started to
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)-(d) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986).
3. 499 U.S. 340,350-51 (1991).
4. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (West Supp. 1999).
5. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
6. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 98 ll.2d 109 (1983).
7. See UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999).
8. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-349, at 2, 9 (1999) (accompanying H.R. 354 to provide
protection for "certain collections of information").
9. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint, AM. ECON.
REV., Mar. 1994, at 1.
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move," allowing Congress and the American people to appreciate the
value of intellectual work, and to perceive the benefits of supporting
the creative community with intellectual property rights. Even the
gap between the introduction of computers and rising productivity
makes that point. Why, in the end, did it take so long for productivity
to increase? The answer, perhaps, is that inventing a new technology
is not enough. Also required is a killer application, an application that
inspires people to learn how to use the new development. Even after
that, routine business applications are needed to give those who
learned the new technology, opportunities to exploit their knowledge
in ways that are fruitful for the economy. And that is where business
method patents would seem to enter the picture, the argument being
that not only does society need patents to motivate technological
advances, it also needs them to motivate the business restructuring
required to take full advantage of new developments. Indeed, the
case for business method patents may seem so obvious, nonpatent
lawyers may find it surprising to learn they have not always been
available. But such is the case, at least officially: it was only two
years ago that State Street gave judicial recognition to business
method patents.
As noted, patent protection for business methods certainly
appears to be a good idea. But is it? Are there problems with this
sudden change in the law? Is State Street really going to lead us to
Easy Street? This paper examines the decision, describes the layers
of difficulties it presents, and then asks what, as a society, we should
do about this part of the trend toward ever stronger intellectual
property rights.
I. STATE STREET
State Street involves a patent entitled "Data Processing System
for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration."'" The
invention keeps track of individual mutual fund investments
("spokes") which have been pooled into a single portfolio (a "hub").
Essentially, what the system does is generate numbers that represent
(among other things) each spoke's share of profits, numbers that are
needed to comply with a set of Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
11. See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Productivity Rose at 5% Rate in 2nd Half of '99, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000, at Al.
12. U.S. Pat. No. 5,193,056.
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Regulations. 3
The patent was attacked on two interrelated grounds. First, there
was the "software" problem. Courts have always had trouble with
process patents because they are afraid that the claims in these patents
are really drawn to principles of nature, which must remain in a
domain where they can be used by all. Traditionally, the Supreme
Court's solution to the problem of differentiating processes that are
principles from processes that are patentable applications, has been to
restrict patents to those processes that effect transformations in the
physical world-for example, sifted flour;14 separated glycerine; 15 or
cured rubber.' 6  But since the invention in State Street produced,
basically, numbers, the argument was made that the invention was
more akin to E = me or the pythagorean theorem than to a patentable
invention. 7
For its part, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had
developed a more sophisticated way to distinguish algorithms found
in software from abstract principles. Under its Freeman-Walter-
Abele analysis, patents were upheld when the claims were drawn to a
specific machine or the algorithm was made a part of a larger physical
process or method. 8 In State Street, the patentee had, in fact, tried to
fit within the latter category by claiming that the algorithm at issue
was part of a method of doing business. That approach was, however,
susceptible to a second challenge, one based on a long line of (mainly
lower) court opinions holding that business methods are too abstract
to be patented. 9
Siding with the unauthorized user, the District Court accepted
both of these arguments. However, matters went surprisingly
differently on appeal. The case was assigned to Judge Giles Rich.
13. See I.R.C. 701-706 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 to 1.704-4 (as
amended in 1997); see also Leo I. Raskind, The Bad Business of Business Method Patents, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 61, 86 (1999).
14. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 139 (1877).
15. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
16. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
17. 927 F. Supp. 502, 516 (D. Mass. 1996) (Saris, J.), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
18. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A.
1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A.
1978); see also Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060-61
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
19. See, e.g., Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552
(1st Cir. 1949), cert denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949); Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160
F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908).
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An ex-patent attorney, Judge Rich was also reputed to have been the
principal drafter of the current (1952) Patent Act, and by the time he
wrote this opinion, rumored to be the longest-sitting federal judge.Y2
This was one of his last opinions, and he apparently decided to go out
with a splash. First, he repudiated Freeman-Walter-Abele on the way
to distinguish applied software from principles. Instead, he laid down
a rather simple test, holding patentable any transformation of data that
produces "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."2' Next, Judge Rich
ran through that case law on business methods to show that the
statements on their nonpatentability were pure dictum." He
concluded: "Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been,
and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for
patentability as applied to any other process or method."
' z
State Street thus makes two changes in the law. It does away
with special rules for determining when software is patentable subject
matter and it brings business methods into the ambit of protection. In
the latter connection, it is important to note that State Street
apparently makes patentable all business methods: although the case
itself was about a computer-implemented business method, the
language of the opinion is extremely broad.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF BusINEss METHOD PATENTING
This brings us to my questions. Clearly, society needs people to
develop new business methods-that is the import of the story about
the productivity numbers. But is it right to encourage them to do this
through patent law? I see two difficulties with moving in that
direction: one concerns the quality of the business patents that are
issuing; the other, the wisdom of recognizing exclusivity in
competitive processes.
A. Quality
The first problem is one that concerns many observers of the
20. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Giles S. Rich, Oldest Active Federal Judge, Dies at 95,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12. 1999, at A13; Jon Thurber, Obituaries, Judge Giles Rich; Patent Law
Authority, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1999, at A22. Judge Rich was first appointed to the bench in
1956 and remained on active status until the time of his death 43 years later.
21. 149 F.3d at 1373.
22. See id. at 1375-77. Professor John Thomas recently discovered that Judge Rich had
relied on this "dictum" himself. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 393,393-94 (1960).
23. 149 F.3d at 1375.
20001
268 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol.16
patent system. It is the frequency with which the Patent Office issues
patents on shockingly mundane business inventions. The most
notorious example is probably Jay Walker's Priceline patent, which
inspired the following comment from a reader of Forbes Magazine:
"Cool! Jay Walker has apparently patented the 'business method'
known as a Dutch auction-a method by which the U.S. Treasury
sells hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of securities each year."
24
And there are many other examples as well. Professor John Thomas at
George Washington cites a method for running a remodeling business
that comprises cataloging ideas, presenting the ideas to a client,
allowing the client to select an idea, and then showing the client a
picture of his or her selection." My personal favorite is in the field of
architecture. It is a method for eliminating hallways through the
process of placing the staircases on the outside of buildings.2
Admittedly, what is particularly bad about these patents is that
the methods they protect were well known before the applicant came
along. For example, anyone familiar with Bergin Hall at Santa Clara
University School of Law knows all about the concept of the outside
staircase. On that issue, it must be said that Judge Rich never
intended for known business methods to be patented. Indeed, he
stressed-cautioned-that business methods must meet the other
legal requirements for patentability, requirements that include novelty
(the method must be new2e) and nonobviousness (the method must be
more inventive than would be expected of an ordinary business
person,8).
But even so, there are problems. Denying patents on known
methods is not so easy to do. One problem is conceptual. The
standard of novelty and inventiveness are not absolute; they receive
coloration from the field at issue in the patent. For example, in
chemistry, where basic structures, syntheses, and theory are well
known, a fairly low standard of inventiveness is needed if patents are
to be available at all. And, in fact, courts have developed a series of
subtests that produce exactly the right kind of standard. 29 The same
24. Byron L. Winn, Readers Say, FoRBEs, May 31, 1999, at 18. Of course, whether
Uncle Sam is infringing depends on the scope of protection afforded.
25. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1139,
1161-62 (1999) (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,668,736).
26. See U.S. Patent No. 5,761,857 ("Lot configuration and building position and method
for residential housing").
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
28. See id. § 103.
29. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (tracing the history of chemical
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can be said about business methods: now that the Federal Circuit has
decided they should be considered patentable, the standards will be
adjusted to make sure that these patents are generally granted.
Indeed, Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., ° a
recent case on infringement, is suggestive on this issue. The question
there was patent scope, and the court took a very narrow view of what
any particular business methodology teaches. Thus, the case found
patent-significant distinctions between two "favorite places" or
"bookmark" features, one using bit mapping protocols and the other
using a character-based system. Since there is a close connection
between scope for purposes of anticipation and scope for
infringement,3 this narrow reading of the claim may foreshadow how
prior art will be used in novelty determinations as well. If so, it will
take a great deal of prior art to convince a court that a particular
method of doing business is obvious or anticipated.
A second reason to be wary of relying solely on novelty and
nonobviousness to protect against mundane patents is practical.
Consider the observation of Greg Aharonian of Patent-News that the
number of non-patent references cited is often very low. 2 In fact, his
finding is not very surprising: there are systematic reasons why this
should be the case. First, because business methods have not been
patented in the past, there is very little patent-related prior art readily
at hand to the examiner corps. More important, because knowledge
about business methods resides mainly in the practices and policies of
the firms that use them, even common methods may not be
documented in the sorts of materials that examiners can efficiently
consult. Unless these difficulties are taken care of-and it is hard to
see how the latter can ever be dealt with effectively-invalid patents
will inevitably issue.
Finally, there is a subjective element to patent decisions that
needs to be considered. It can be seen in three cases the Supreme
Court decided on the same day: Graham v. John Deere Co. and
Calmar v. Cook,33 were about about a plow and a spray can,
nonobviousness); see also ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLIcY 589-90 (2d ed.
1997).
30. 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
31. See, e.g., Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 203 (1894). The connection is
encapsulated in the familiar saying: "that which infringes if later, anticipates if earlier." Id.
32. Gregory Aharonian, Internet Patent News Service, June 23, 1999, available at
<http://www.bustpatents.com/ipns.htm> (on file with author).
33. 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (consolidated in Graham v. John Deere).
2000]
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respectively, and United States v. Adams, was about a battery. The
first two patents were invalidated on obviousness grounds, but the
third was upheld. It is not easy to distinguish the cases, and many
suspect that the different outcomes had more to do with the justices'
familiarity with the fields of the invention than with the inventiveness
of the advances at issue in the cases. Thus, the plow and the spray
can involved mechanicals-hinges, gaskets, ribs, and such. Because
judges deal with (or think they should be able to deal with) such
devices in their ordinary lives, they may have found it difficult to
imagine that a particular arrangement of these familiar objects could
be inventive enough to merit protection. But working with electricity
can be dangerous; most people stay as far away from it as possible.
Free to admit that they lacked intimate knowledge of batteries, the
justices were also free to find the invention at issue in Adams
nonobvious. The general lesson here is this. What judges don't
understand, they think is patentable-there is a kind of "gee wiz"
factor that is hard to overcome. In contrast, what judges do
understand (or think they should pretend they understand), appears
obvious-an "I could have done that" view takes hold instead. That
is important in this context because it is rather probable that judges do
not understand (or bother to pretend they understand) the Internet or
software. Thus, we can certainly expect fairly widespread validation
of at least certain classes of business method patents.
Of course, one could dismiss the problem of invalid patents as
ephemeral-if a patent covers a business method that is really
important, it will be challenged and invalidated. But while the
potential for successful challenge is certainly real, it is not clear that it
is an adequate solution. After all, patents have in terrorem effects: no
one wants to invest in a business that cannot succeed without first
winning a lawsuit. Moreover, much can happen during the transition
period between allowance and invalidation. For example, many
industries experience shake outs. These have the beneficial effect of
culling out those firms that are the least competent. But to some
extent, business method patents protect businesses from competition.
Thus, they can function in a way that preserves inefficiencies in the
marketplace.
In some fields, there is another, more enduring, problem. Take
law and medicine: substantial relationships are built (lawyer and
client, doctor and patient). Once loyalty develops, whatever business
method drew the client to the provider becomes irrelevant; even if the
34. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
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patent on the method is invalidated, the client will stay put. Of
course, concepts like "loyalty" and "relationships" are somewhat retro
and passe. Now we talk about "stickiness." But this is just a
vocabulary shift. As with loyalty, once a sticky method takes hold,
invalidation of the patent on that method will make no difference.
This is an important point, so let us examine it with some
illustrations. One way to produce a sticky business method is lock in.
Consider, for example, Amazon.com's patented one-click technology,
which has been enforced against BamesandNoble.com 5 One click is
very nice for shoppers because once they have inputted various bits of
shipping and billing information, they can check out quickly on
subsequent visits. Accordingly, if Amazon has the exclusive right to
one-click, we can expect that many customers will patronize its site.
What happens if the patent is eventually invalidated-will there then
be effective competition? Probably not because once a book buyer
has entered information at Amazon, there is no reason to go
elsewhere, particularly now that Amazon has the capacity to further
analyze the information and offer its patrons useful suggestions about
future purchases. Buyers who rely on such services will not care if
the patent is invalidated, and rival sites are permitted to utilize one-
click: once locked in to Amazon, shoppers will not likely visit a site
that is less informative and requires more work.
Another way to make customers stick is with network effects.
An example of a network effect is AOL's instant messenger." A
user's ability to exchange email in real time is useful only when the
people the user wishes to reach are also on the same system. As a
result, the value of the system as a whole depends directly on its size.
I do not know whether AOL has protected its system with a patent,
but if it has, then instant messanger is a good example of the problem
with relying on invalidation. The reason is this: if there were such a
patent, it would be extremely significant because it would force
everyone interested in instant messanger to sign up with AOL. But
once a large (and valuable) network is created, invalidation will not
matter at all. True, rivals would appear, but because they would
necessarily start small, they would not be able to deliver the same
35. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D.
Wash. 1999).
36. See Saul Hansell, In Cyberspace, Rivals Skirmish Over Messaging, N.Y. TIMEs, July
24, 1999, at Al (describing America Online's use of its copyrights and trademarks to reserve its
instant messaging service to its own network of subscribers); Leslie Helm, AOL Aligns with
Apple in Instant Messaging Venture, L.A. TIMEs, July 30, 1999, at C3.
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value to their customers. The bottom line is thus a terrible transition
problem: patents do not need to be in force for long to exert a
substantial effect on competition.
Now, it must be admitted that Congress has already noticed that
there is a problem here, that examining business methods for novelty
and nonobviousness is going to be difficult, and that invalid patents
can be problematic. It has even done something to fix the situation.
Soon after State Street, it enacted the "first inventor" defense (also
called a prior user right). Under this provision, there is a defense to
infringement in favor of any person who: "acting in good faith,
actually reduced the subject matter [of a business method patent] to
practice at least one year before the effective filing date of such
patent, and commercially used the subject matter before the effective
filing date of such patent. ' 7
Unfortunately, however, this fix is not enough. It is very limited:
in order to prevent the first inventor from competing away all patent
profits, the defense can be asserted only by the party who established
the defense and it can only be used with respect to the specific subject
matter claimed." Furthermore, it can create effective competition
only when there is someone who was positioned, before the
application was filed, to enter the patentee's business. Most
important, recognition of this defense could have perverse effects in
future litigation. By creating this defense, Congress may be viewed
as having implicitly endorsed business method patenting.39 Further,
the first inventor defense may actually reduce the extent to which
other unpublicized inventions will be regarded as prior art in the
future.4"
37. 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
38. See id § 273(b)(6) & (b)(3)(C).
39. Cf. Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.2d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding
that art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 can be combined with other art to find an invention nonobvious
on the basis that Congress amended § 103 to address the narrow problem of §§ 102(f) and 103
rejections in the context of large-fin research. In so doing, the court ignored the fact that
Congress had never, in fact, considered the broader question of whether § 102(0 should ever be
used for § 103 purposes.).
40. This theory is somewhat controversial and complicated. Section 102(g) refers to
inventions "made in this country by another who has not abandoned, suppressed or concealed
it." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994). Although the section is mainly read as limiting the field of who
can claim priority, it has been used to protect the reliance interests of those who commercialized
inventions without publicizing them. See, e.g., Dunlop Holdings, Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524
F,2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Pierre Jean Hubert, The
Prior User Right of H.R. 400: a Careful Balancing of Competing Interests, 14 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 193 (1998). Since the first inventor defense will now be
available to protect such users in the case of business methods, see H.R. Rep. No. 106-287, at
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There are a few other, and potentially more salutary,
developments on the horizon. First, there is building sentiment to
improve the performance of the Patent and Trademark Office. For
example, Robert Merges recently published an article suggesting
better pay and training for examiners; an end to the system of
awarding examiners bonuses for final dispositions (which tend to
strongly favor allowances, which are not appealed, over
disallowances, which are); substantial revision of the reexamination
system; and external review of performance.' Second, courts may
become better at assessing novelty and nonobviousness. Encouraging
in this regard is AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,42 which
concerned a telephone billing method. In the first incarnation of that
case, the Federal Circuit held the business method patentable subject
matter. However, in a later phase, the patent was invalidated as
obvious in light of MCI's Friends and Family Program. Third, there
is the potential of e-mail and the Internet. We saw their tendency to
exacerbate the problems of invalid patents through lock-in and
network effects, but they could also be a part of the solution to the
problem of bad patents. Thus, for example, the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) advertised successfully on its web site for art that
it later used to defeat a patent on a privacy protection protocol that it
was using.43 Fourth, Leo Raskind has argued that the misuse defense,
somewhat moribund in recent years, may enjoy a revival. If, for
instance, it were to turn out that the invention in State Street is the
only efficent way to run the IRS calculations on which it is based,
then the patent may be valid, but any failure to license it broadly and
on reasonable terms could be regarded as misuse.4 Finally, there is
an aspect of the Wang case on "favorite places" technology that is
also very hopeful. As we saw, that case involved a valid patent, but
the court construed it quite narrowly. If business method claims are
similarly limited to specific implementations, they will be much less
44-49 (1999), courts may reason that § 102(g) art should not generally be construed as patent-
defeating.
41. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEYTECH. LJ. 577 (1999).
42. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
43. See World Wide Web Consortium, P3P and the Intermind patent (visited Mar. 27,
2000) <http://www.w3.org/1999/04/P3P-PatentBackground.htnl>. The ad read as follows:
"WANTED: When did you first see a technology like this?... W3C is looking for information
concerning any systems that predate the Intermind patent... !' Id.
44. See Raskind, supra note 13. Patents cannot be enforced until misuse is purged. See
DONALD S. CFHSUM, CFHSUM ON PATENTS § 19.04[4] (1998).
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problematic.
But despite these hopeful signs, I remain concerned about
quality. As noted earlier, no one goes out to buy a lawsuit; patents,
even invalid patents, exert an influence on the market. Furthermore,
as the Federal Circuit strengthens the presumption of validity, these
patents become increasingly difficult to challenge.45
B. Wisdom
Invalid patents are not, however, my main concern. My real
problem with this trend is more controversial: I even question the
value of valid business method patents. I believe that they adversely
affect innovation, and worse, the economy. These patents are not
associated with the benefits that, as a constitutional matter, justify the
recognition of private property. And the economic costs they impose
can be astounding. Let me take these points one at a time.
As I noted at the outset, business methods are not the only
example of newly created or expanded intellectual property rights.
There is also database protection, dilution, blurring, cybersquatting,
and misappropriation. A strange aspect to many of these expansions
is that they occur without any specific thought given to the need for
protection. Once a creative product (a mark, a celebrity image, a
business method) is recognized as having value, it is assumed that
someone has a right to capture that value. Measured against the
background of property rights propagation generally, this is a rather
novel approach. In the world of tangibles, rights are recognized only
when there is a public (not just a private) benefit to be gained: to
avoid the tragedy of the commons-to prevent overfishing or
overgrazing; to encourage pollution control, resource management,
and conservation.4 Otherwise, the trend in property law has been
towards the commons-to creating parks, clean waterways,
playgrounds, zoos, and such. In intellectual property law, similar
attention was once paid to the question of justifications. The framers
of the Constitution, for example, rejected "just deserts" and other
45. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 1984 & Supp. 1998); Medtronic Inc. v. Intermedics,
Inc., 799 F.2d 734,741 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("35 U.S.C. § 282 creates a presumption that a patent is
valid and imposes the burden of proving invalidity on the challenger by 'clear and convincing
evidence.' That burden is permanent and does not change."); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527
U.S. 150 (1999) (requiring the Federal Circuit to review appeals of FO decisions on a
deferential basis).
46. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968); H.
Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124, 134 (1954) (giving an earlier version of the theory of the tragedy of the commons).
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moral claims in favor of pure utilitarian approaches. Thus,
intellectual property rights generally are basically viewed as solutions
to the free rider problem; patents are also valued because they
encourage disclosure.
But neither the free-rider nor the disclosure rationale justifies
business method patents. Businesses are largely practiced in public.
Accordingly, there is little need to especially encourage disclosure.
Business methods are also hard to free ride on. They depend in strong
ways on the social structure within the firms utilizing them-on
compensation schemes, lines of reporting, supervising policies, and
other business factors. Moreover, as we saw, sticky business methods
are their own reward. With lock in, network effects, and even good
old fashioned loyalty, lead time (the first mover advantage) goes a
long way to assuring returns adequate to recoup costs and earn
substantial profit. In sum, while business innovations are certainly
desirable, it is not clear that business method patents are needed to
spur people to create them.
On the costs side, matters are even more unfavorable for
business method patents. All patents impose social costs. Patented
products are more expensive; quantity and quality are less than they
would be in a competitive market. Furthermore, there is deadweight
loss created as those who would buy the product at the competitive
price forgo purchase at the higher patent price. There is also an
offsets problem. Because knowledge is cumulative, any rise in the
price of using existing intellectual products also increases the cost of
innovating future products. Without free and unfettered ability to-in
Sir Isaac Newton's words-stand on the shoulders of giants,48
innovators are not able to push the frontiers of science forward.
Spillover benefits are likewise reduced, for the private right to control
a new technology can be used to prevent others from applying that
technology in ways the rights holder did not consider.
Of course, some patents impose more of these costs than do
others. To determine how high costs would run for any particular
patent, it is useful to conceptualize knowledge as a pyramid: the big
ideas are on top; specific applications are at the bottom. Specific
applications are largely dead ends. Private ownership of these
47. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Intellectual Property Law, in FUNDAMENTALS
OF AMERICAN LAW 507 (Alan B. Morrison, ed. 1996); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function
of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
48. See ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 31 (1965) (quoting a letter
by Sir Isaac Newton).
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applications does not entail high social cost because others will never
need these inventions as a basis for their own inventiveness. But as
one moves up the pyramid, the costs associated with privatization
increase. As a result, the big inventions at the top-inventions
denominated as ideas or principles-are not considered patentable.
They must remain in the public domain because they have
instrumental significance. Society needs them to generate other
specific applications, and also to open new technological
opportunities. The issue, then, is to locate business methods on this
pyramid. In fact, they are towards the top. Partly that is so for the
familiar reasons just discussed: they are instrumental in the traditional
sense, as the basis for further inventiveness. But they are important in
another, somewhat different sense as well: they are instrumental to
the economy.
To see this, it is helpful to shift gears and to consider a somewhat
related issue: should sports moves be patentable? What, for example,
if Candy Cummings had patented the curve ball or Dick Fosbury, his
high jump "flop?" Would sporting events be as popular? It seems
unlikely. After all, sporting events are interesting because they pit
humans against one another to determine whose abilities are superior.
For that competition to be true, participants need to compete-
literally-on a level playing field. Allowing one athlete to use a
move that is denied to others would destroy the essence of the event. 49
The same can be said of business methods: winning and losing is
supposed to depend on execution, not on exclusive rights to the
moves that need to be executed. We want the best book store to
dominate the market, not the store that makes it easiest to check out.
Or, just as sporting events identify the best athlete and team, market
competition is what this society relies on to determine the best use for
particular resources. If that mechanism is distorted, then Adam
Smith's unseen hand is crippled.
Now, in sports, the problem of patented moves is somewhat
reduced because competitions have organizers (for instance, baseball
has a commissioner). These organizers can easily ban the use of
moves (or products) that are not made available to all. But no one is
positioned to do that with respect to business methods: Bud Selig is
far more likely to bring John Rocker into line than Joel Klein is to
tame Bill Gates.
The bottom line is this. The costs of business method patents are
49. See generally Jeffrey A. Smith, Comment, It's Your Move-No It's Not! The
Application of Patent Law to Sports Moves, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1051 (1999).
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very high. The benefits, at least the traditional benefits, are low. The
ratio is terrible. The case for patents on business methods is simply
not there, at least not in general. Indeed, it is almost unnecessary to
say this here, at Santa Clara University School of Law in Silicon
Valley, where the free flow of information among firms may well
have had a great deal to do with economic success!0 State Street now
provides the opportunity to tie up such knowledge for the future, to
privatize it, and prevent it from leaking out to all users. The firms of
this Valley should be the ones most cognizant of the danger this poses
to innovation.
Ill. WHERE TO Go FROM HERE
Given the problem of business method patents, a strong
argument can be made that State Street should be reversed, either
judicially or legislatively. However, these remarks have been
coached in general terms; it is not implausible that there are specific
areas where business method patents achieve socially useful results.
John Thomas, for example, has suggested that method patents should
be confined to what he calls the technological arts: production
methods rather than lawyering methods; physical, not medical
treatments; industrial as opposed to business applications. Thomas
bases this suggestion on the Constitution's reference to the "useful
arts, 51 which, he claims, is the 18" Century's word for what we in the
21s' Century call "technology. 52
That would be one cut at the problem, but I am not convinced it
is the right one. I do not know what the drafters of the Constitution
meant by "useful arts." In addition, it isn't clear to me that the word
"technology" is unambiguous enough to create a clear judicial line.
Most important, I don't understand why that particular divide would
distinguish between fields where patents make sense and fields where
they do not. To me, the better way to define the scope of patent
protection is by sticking with the question of rationales, by asking
where a patent incentive is actually required to promote investment in
innovation.
As to that, let us step back to the State Street decision one more
50. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575
(1999).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
52. See Thomas, supra note 25, at 1164.
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time. As we saw, the first part of Judge Rich's opinion made patent
protection for software easier to obtain. At one time, I might have had
many of the objections to software patenting that I've already voiced
with regard to privatizing business knowledge. For instance, it would
have slowed progress in this Valley. But at this point in time, the
software industry is mature; new developments are hard-fought-
increasingly expensive to create, yet they remain cheap to copy.
Given that secrecy is also sometimes a real option with software
developments, I think we can assume that the first part of the State
Street decision is good law. If so, then perhaps those business
methods that partake of the "software rationale" should also be
candidates for protection. That is, I could easily imagine denying
protection to the likes of frequent flyer miles, junk bonds, curve balls,
and Fosdick flops. But we saw that getting the productivity numbers
up after the introduction of computers required both killer and routine
applications; encouraging these applications with patents may make
some sense. Note, however, that the business method patents that
would be allowed under this rationale would be highly limited. Only
applications-new and nonobvious computer-implementations-
would merit protection. In essence, these patents would run to the
software, not to the business model that the software implements.
Such an approach has much to recommend it. First, as a
theoretical matter, it would achieve congruence with the way that
intellectual property law has always treated principles. As we saw,
both patent law and copyright distinguish between principles and
instantiations of those principles (expressions or applications). An
instantiation can be privately owned, but the abstraction must go into
the public domain.53 Under the move suggested here, business models
would be dealt with similarly. The abstract model would remain free
for all to utilize. However, specific implementations of the model
would be considered the subject matter of patent law.
Second, this approach would eliminate the specter of patents in
areas that do not need the special incentives of exclusive rights
regimes. Junk bonds, for example, are good examples of inventions
that generate their own rewards. They do not need patent protection
and would not merit it under this system because they do not require
software implementation.
Third, this approach would focus the courts on the inventiveness
of the software: any sort of "gee wiz" factor deriving from using
banal real world business models on the Internet would be eliminated.
53. See discussion supra.
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That in itself would be a substantial accomplishment. As we saw in
the quote from Forbes, 4 what strikes many observers as wrong about
business method patenting is that to can be used to protect processes
whose only inventive features involve the transfer of a well known
business model, such as the Dutch auction, to cyberspace. Under the
approach suggested here, Internet utilization of real world models
might still be patentable, but now only when the translation actually
required inventiveness, that is, the creation of nonobvious
implementing technology.
Most important, this approach would yield patents of rather
narrow scope. The protection would run only against the specific
implementation disclosed in the patent; anyone who could implement
the business with new software, or utilize it without a computer,
would know that such use would escape infringement. Thus, it would
be clear to all that the United States could continue to use its method
for selling treasury bills even if Walker's Priceline patent is valid.
And since other online businesses could imitate the patented business
method (Priceline's auction or Amazon.com's one-click) with
different software, the distortive impact of these patents on market
competition would be minimized.
In the final analysis, there is an irony in State Street. The main
reason for the increase in business method applications was because
Freeman-Walter-Abele made patent eligibility for software turn on
placing the program into the context of a process. Now that the
subject-matter requirement can be met by generating numbers that
produce useful, concrete, and tangible results, there is no longer a
need for what was, quite frankly, always a bit of a dodge. As we saw,
business method patents make little sense from an economic
perspective; if they are not even needed to create legal fictions, why
recognize them at all?
54. See Winn, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
55. Other examples include two of Amazon.com's best known patents: the patent on one-
click basically covers the concept (particularly well known in bars) of asking the seller to put a
particular purchase "on my tab." Amazon also has a patent on its affiliates program, which
allows web sites to refer customers to Amazon in exchange for a fee. See Amazon.com Patent
Covers Fee Program On Customer Referral, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at B8; Mo Krochmal
& Jason Coombs, Amazon Associates Plan Wins Patent Protection (Feb. 25, 2000)
<http:llwww.techweb.comlwire/storyTWB20000225SO013>. That business model is also quite
prevalent in the real world (particularly among lawyers): it is known as the kickback.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Of late, the information sector has done a very good job at
attracting the attention of law makers. That is why so many new
intellectual property rights have been recognized. The time has come
for this community-especially this Valley-to think about whether
things have gone far enough, whether privatization is starting to chill
innovation rather than promote it. As to business method patents in
particular, there is an expression about throwing the baby out with the
bath water. Perhaps what we are dealing with here is the opposite
situation: we are keeping the bath water (business method patents)
when all we really need or want is the baby (patents on software).
